The Second Generation of Immigrants by Schermers, Henry G.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 82 
Issue 5 Issue 5&6 
1984 
The Second Generation of Immigrants 
Henry G. Schermers 
University of Leiden 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry G. Schermers, The Second Generation of Immigrants, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1415 (1984). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss5/19 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE SECOND GENERATION OF 
IMMIGRANTS 
Henry G. Schermers* 
During the 1960s, many workers from the Mediterranean region mi-
grated to more northerly regions of Europe. Often they brought their 
wives, and children were born in the host country. The situation of these 
children, the "second generation" of immigrants, deserves our attention. 
In many respects the offspring who make up this second generation of 
immigrants are closer to their country of residence than to the country of 
their parents. Yet the desirability of integrating these young people into the 
country where they were born and live may be questioned. If they are able 
to speak their parents' language, they could be of great value to the country 
from which their parents came. It has been argued that sending these chil-
dren, with their European educations, back to their native countries would 
benefit those countries by providing a sort of "technical assistance." 1 
Nonetheless, whether these children could be integrated into the society 
of their native country and whether that society could make use of their 
foreign educations are questions whose answers remain unclear. Even if 
these uncertainties could be favorably resolved, it is unacceptable for host 
countries to force people to grant this sort of ''technical assistance." Native 
countries that want the "second generation" back could try to persuade 
these young people to return to their "fatherland," or perhaps could even 
try to call them back. The European tradition of respect for the individual, 
however, demands that members of this second generation not be forced 
into rendering "technical assistance" to their native countries. 
In some countries, such as the United States and France, birth in the 
national territory automatically confers citizenship, but in other countries, 
such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany, a child has the nationality 
of his father, regardless of his place of birth. In this latter group of coun-
tries the position of the children of immigrants may be particularly difficult. 
To illustrate the situation, we will use a hypothetical example involving two 
brothers born in Holland of Moroccan parents and two brothers born in 
Holland of Italian parents. Morocco is taken as an example solely for the 
reason that Moroccans are the largest group of non-European foreigners in 
the Netherlands (93,100 out of a total of 537,600 foreigners).2 Italy is used 
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as an example because it is the EEC country with the largest number of 
workers in foreign countries. We assume in our illustration that all the chil-
dren mentioned have grow1:1 up in Dutch-speaking surroundings, that they 
went to Dutch schools, speak Dutch better than the language of their native 
country, and are culturally adapted to the Dutch way of life. One should 
not underestimate the tensions that develop within these families between 
parents who cherish their national cultural values and children who actu-
ally belong to a different culture. In this respect the boys will be better off 
than their sisters. In particular, the Moroccans' sisters may be under paren-
tal pressure to stay home all day and wait until their father gives them in 
marriage to a Moroccan Moslem, someone with whom they may have very 
little in common. Of course, the tensions within the family will also influ-
ence the lives of our four boys, and careful study is needed before one can 
really appreciate their position. In the present illustration, however, we will 
focus on the boys' legal status, and for this purpose assume that each set of 
brothers has one "good" brother and one "bad" brother. 
The good boys will face little or no difficulty if they want to become 
Dutch citizens. They can easily naturalize. Conversely, if they want to 
keep the same citizenship as their parents, they will receive the most 
favorable treatment accorded to foreigners by the Netherlands. They are 
entitled to stay in the country and will receive unemployment allowances if 
they cannot find a job. Even if they commit a crime, they will not be de-
ported, unless the crime is of a particularly serious nature, such as large-
scale trafficking in drugs. Problems only arise when these boys want to 
marry girls from outside the Netherlands. 
Until recently, foreigners lawfully residing in the Netherlands could 
bring in their wives without any difficulty. The basic human right to marry 
the person of one's own choice was considered to entail that the wives of 
people lawfully residing in the country had to be admitted as well.3 As a 
matter of principle, the authorities may not discriminate on the ground of 
sex. Therefore, a foreign girl lawfully residing in the Netherlands could 
also bring in her husband, once she got married. A boy from Morocco (or 
any other country) marrying a Moroccan girl living in the Netherlands was 
admitted to the Netherlands as easily as the girl from Morocco marrying a 
Moroccan boy living in the Netherlands. This led to abuse. Fictitious mar-
riages were made by young foreigners who wanted admission to the 
Netherlands for economic reasons. Once in the country, the marriage was 
dissolved. The Dutch government objected to this, not only for legal and 
economic reasons, but also on social grounds. These immigrants were in an 
extremely weak position in the labor market. Only rarely could they find a 
job; usually they lived on unemployment allowances. The situation has re-
cently worsened as the number of unemployed young people has increased. 
The handicap faced by unskilled foreigners is such that they have practi-
cally no chance of finding employment. 
Human Rights Convention], and the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers, Nov. 24, 1977, 93 Europ. T.S. (1977). In total, about 12 million foreigners live within 
the European Community. See Turpin, Le nouveau regime juridique des etrangers en France: 
clzangement et continuite, 71 R.C.D.l.P. 25 (1982). 
3. q. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, art. 8. 
April/May 1984] Second Generation Immigrants 1417 
In October 1983, new rules were made. Since then, only those foreign-
ers who earn an income of at least 1445 florins per month (almost $500) 
may bring a foreign spouse into the Netherlands.4 This requirement will 
not normally lead to an infringement of the basic human right of marriage, 
guaranteed by both article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights5 and article 12 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.6 The Moroccan born and living in the Netherlands is free to marry 
whomever he (or she) wants, provided that he (she) moves to Morocco if 
the couple cannot make their living in the Netherlands. One cannot validly 
argue that a person who grew up in the Netherlands cannot be compelled to 
move to another country for married life, because one of the two spouses 
will have to move anyway. The choice of a partner from the person's native 
country may, furthermore, indicate that the person still feels close ties to 
that country. The couple as a unit is probably closer to the foreign country 
than to the Netherlands. Regardless, the two good boys of our example 
can, in practice, overcome all problems, as they may choose Dutch citizen-
ship, after which they may marry whomever they like and stay with their 
spouses in the Netherlands. 
More difficult, and therefore more interesting as a legal matter, is the 
position of the bad boys. Suppose that before their eighteenth birthday 
these boys are convicted for trafficking in drugs. Their naturalization is 
refused on the ground, provided for by law, that Dutch citizenship cannot 
be granted to persons convicted of serious crimes. So the bad boys remain 
Moroccan and Italian. Like the good boys who keep their foreign citizen-
ship, they are not entitled to bring in a foreign wife if their declared income 
(which excludes income from theft) is less than 1445 florins per month. In 
addition, they cannot vote, and they continue in other respects to be treated 
as foreigners. Unlike the good boys, however, they cannot change the situa-
tion by accepting Dutch citizenship. 
The bad boys' situation may become even worse. Let us assume that the 
bad boys, when they are twenty-five years old, again engage in drug traf-
ficking and are caught and sentenced to several years of imprisonment. 
Legislation in the Netherlands, as in several other countries, provides that 
foreigners convicted of serious crimes may be expelled. Both boys still have 
foreign citizenship, so after they have served their sentences they may be 
deported to their country of origin, notwithstanding the fact that they never 
lived there, perhaps hardly speak the language, perhaps have no relatives 
there, and feel no cultural affection for the country. This seems wrong. The 
two boys are so much closer to the Netherlands than to Morocco and Italy 
that it seems unfair to expel them. It seems unfair not only with respect to 
the boys concerned and their families, but also to their countries of origin. 
If any general way of life or any form of education is responsible for their 
bad behavior, it must be the Dutch one. Neither Morocco nor Italy was 
4. See the June 30, 1983 letter of the State Secretary of Justice to the Second Chamber of 
the Dutch Parliament, Parliamentary Document 1982-83, No. 17984. 
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, reprinted in 6 INTL. LEGAL 
MATERIALS 368, 375 (1967). 
6. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, art. 12. 
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involved in the formation of these boys. It would be unfair to charge these 
countries with the reeducation and further control these criminals need. 
The Netherlands is also better able to look after these boys, who have their 
roots in Dutch society, where their families live. 
Should the Netherlands and other states having similar legislation 
change their rules and automatically grant citizenship to all children of for-
eigners who are born in the country and have lived there ever since? As 
usual there is another side to this coin. Generally, foreigners are in a weak 
position. Insofar as they are racially different or speak with a foreign ac-
cent, they are identifiable as a group. They may be inclined to trespass 
against some rules that would not exist in their home country; they may be 
subject to stronger temptations than many others to commit property of-
fenses since they belong to the economically weakest group. Even if the 
group as a whole behaves no worse than any other group, they will still be 
noticed as a group. The Moroccan committing a crime may elicit the com-
ment: "Again a foreigner, we should get rid of them all." Thus, an explicit 
rule that only good foreigners will be allowed to remain in the country, and 
that all those who commit crimes will be expelled, may be of benefit to the 
group as a whole. Once the native population knows that criminal foreign-
ers will be automatically expelled, it may be more willing to accept the 
others. In this way, expulsion may lead to a higher group standard. 
Another argument against an automatic grant of citizenship to immi-
grant children born and raised in a host country such as the Netherlands is 
that, generally speaking, a country need not grant hospitality to people that 
it does not want. Understandably, a host country may desire to rid itself of 
undesirable foreigners, and international crime would become too easy if 
criminals could claim refuge in foreign countries. Thus, in principle, the 
Netherlands should be free to expel foreign criminals. 
The strength of this principle is weakened, however, where a second 
generation of immigrants is involved, and in cases like the ones in our ex-
ample, where the relationship between the boys and the host country is so 
close, the persons concerned need adequate legal protection. Dutch law 
grants them that protection. They may challenge a deportation decision in 
an administrative court, and they may bring a civil action against the gov-
ernment for committing a wrongful act. The Dutch courts will prevent de-
portation if it is illegal. 
But what grounds for illegality can be invoked? Is deportation to a 
strange country a form of inhuman treatment, and thus prohibited by arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights? Usually this will be 
difficult to argue. In several cases the European Commission of Human 
Rights has held that expulsion may, in exceptional circumstances, be con-
trary to the Convention, and in particular to article 3, but in these cases 
there were strong reasons to believe that the expelled person would be sub-
ject to some type of treatment prohibited by article 3 in the country to 
which he was to be sent.7 Could it be submitted that our Moroccan and 
Italian boys would be subject to inhuman treatment in Morocco and Italy? 
1. See, e.g., X contre la Belgique, Le Recueil de Decisions de la Commission Europe-enne 
des Droits de l'Homme (No. 984/61) at 39-40 (1961); Xagainsl The Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 462 (Eur. Commn. of Human Rights); M. 
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It should be clear that not all ill treatment violates article 3. That would 
frustrate the purpose of the Convention, which is to guarantee spec!fic 
human rights in the participating states and not to grant a general right to 
be well treated. In the case of Ireland against the United Kingdom, the 
European Court of Human Rights held: "ID-treatment must attain a mini-
mum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assess-
ment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative .... " 8 For our 
present case this means that expulsion to Italy could never be in breach of 
article 3. Since Italy is also bound by the Human Rights Convention, viola-
tions of article 3 are prohibited there. On the basis of article 13 of the 
Convention, Italy must provide a remedy for violations. Even if Italy pro-
vided no remedy, an alleged violation of the Convention could be brought 
to Strasbourg, because individuals in Italy have the right of individual peti-
tion under article 25 of the Convention. 
For the Moroccan boy the situation may be different. Normally, expul-
sion cannot be seen as inhuman treatment, but additional circumstances 
may alter the situation. Our Moroccan boy may have participated in anti-
Moroccan activities or he may run the risk of being badly treated in Mo-
rocco for other reasons. The court reviewing the expulsion order would 
have to assess the full situation before deciding whether the order violated 
article 3. 
Could the Italian boy invoke European Community law to preclude his 
expulsion to Italy? Probably not. The Italian boy's father was a foreign 
worker. The boy, as long as he is under the age of twenty-one or a depen-
dent, may claim certain rights, including the right to remain with his family, 
due to his father's status.9 Indeed, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities has gone quite far in accepting that the equality of workers 
from other Member States also applies to the children of such foreign work-
ers.10 Employment of the father would be affected if his children did not 
receive the full protection of the national legal system, including social se-
curity benefits and school grants. However, it may simply go too far to 
claim that the children of a foreign worker should have the same rights as 
children of domestic workers in claiming the citizenship of the place where 
they were born. 
Perhaps there are other grounds for the bad Italian boy to claim a right 
to stay with his family in the Netherlands. One could argue that an adult 
foreigner with a severe criminal record is in such a weak position socially 
and would be so severely affected by expulsion to a strange country that he 
must be considered a "dependent" in the sense that term is used in article 
10 of EEC Regulation 1612/68.11 Yet this alone would not entitle such an 
Giama against Belgium, 1980 Y.B. EUR. CoNV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 428 (Eur. Commn. of 
Human Rights). 
8. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 58 I.L.R. 190, 264 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights 1978). 
9. See EEC Regulation No. 1612/68, On Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the 
Community, [Eng. Special Ed. 1968 (II)] OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L257/2) 475 (Oct. 15, 1968). 
The texts of the EEC acts referred to are published in T. HARTLEY, EEC IMMIGRATION LAW 
(1978)'. 
10. See, e.g., Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Miinchen (Case No. 9/74), 1974 E. Comm. 
Ct. J. Rep. 773. 
I 1. [Eng. Special Ed. 1968 II] (No. L 257 /2) O.J. EuR. COMM. 475 (Oct. 15, 1968). 
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adult to stay in the country since he would be covered by Council Directive 
64/221 on the coordination of special measures, justified on grounds of 
public policy, public security, or public health, concerning the movement 
and residence of foreign nationals. 12 However, the bad Italian boy's status 
as a dependent would ensure that he was considered a member of his fa-
ther's family even after he reached the age of twenty-one. This would bring 
into play article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
obliges the Netherlands to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the 
right to respect for family life. Expulsion of one member of the family 
could be contrary to this provision. 
At first sight the position of the Italian boy in this respect does not differ 
fundamentally from that of the Moroccan boy. He too may plead that he is 
still a dependent member of the family and that his expulsion would there-
fore violate article 8 of the Human Rights Convention. Still, the position of 
the Italian boy seems stronger because Italy is a member of the European 
Community. If he can demonstrate that he is a dependent, he may be de-
ported only under the conditions of Council Directive 64/221 - which 
means not only that he can invoke some procedural protections, such as 
court remedies, but also that the question whether his expulsion is justified 
on grounds of public policy could be considered by the Court of Justice in a 
preliminary ruling. 13 "Public policy" is a rather vague notion, and some 
national judiciaries have interpreted it far more broadly than others. The 
divergence in interpretation leaves much discretion to the Court of Justice 
in interpreting the Community notion of "public policy." So far the Court 
of Justice has been careful to avoid any interpretation of Community law 
which might infringe upon the European Convention on Human Rights. 
We may, therefore, expect that the Court of Justice would not find it easy to 
justify on grounds of public policy an expulsion that could lead to the split-
ting of a family. 
Apart from the human rights aspects, other reasons may exist for the 
Court of Justice to rule in favor of the Italian boy. In case of doubt the 
Court has repeatedly relied on the interpretation that best serves the pur-
poses of the Common Market or the general principles oflaw and equity. 14 
Both would benefit if immigrants of the second generation had a right to 
remain in the country to which their fathers migrated. Hence, it is likely 
that the Court of Justice would not be unwilling to interpret the applicable 
provisions of Community law in a way helpful to our Italian boy. Never-
theless, while it would be appropriate to request a preliminary ruling on the 
status of our Italian boy as a member of the family of a migrating worker, it 
remains doubtful that the Court of Justice would extend the freedom of 
12. Pour la coordination des mesures speciales aux etrangers en matiere de deplacement et 
de sejour justifiees par des raisons d'ordre public, de securite publique, 7 J.O. COMM. EUR. 
(Directive du Conseil No. 64/221/CEE7) 850 (Feb. 25, 1964). 
13. Domestic courts applying either the Directive itself or national rules promulgated 
under it may request a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Directive under art. 177 
of the EEC Treaty. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Co=unity, Mar. 25, 1957, 
art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 76-7 (1958) (hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. 
14. See Schermers, The European Court of Justice: Promotor of European Integration, 22 
AM. J. COMP. L. 444, 453-64 (1974). 
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movement of workers so far that the adult son of an Italian worker would 
have a right to stay in the Netherlands. 
May the Italian boy claim a right of his own under Community law to 
stay in the Netherlands? He cannot if he is not a worker or someone look-
ing for work in accordance with the rules of EEC law. 15 Even if he were 
covered by the EEC rules for foreign workers, they would probably not 
help him since article 48 of the EEC Treaty permits the Netherlands to 
restrict the free movement of workers on grounds of public policy or public 
security. It is generally understood that this provision entitles the Member 
States to deport criminals. 
Our conclusion must be that under international law and Community 
law the Netherlands is under no obligation to grant its citizenship or even 
residence to the adult children of immigrants who are no longer depen-
dents. Any country is entitled to provide that children have the nationality 
of their father, rather than of the place of their birth. 
Would it be desirable to change this law? It has strong roots in Dutch 
history. The Netherlands is a trading country. Its citizens have traveled all 
over the world for centuries. Often travelers took their wives and had chil-
dren in foreign countries where they had sojourned only briefly. It is un-
derstandable that they wanted these children to be Dutch. Furthermore, the 
Netherlands has never tried to stimulate the immigration of foreigners. As 
a densely populated country it feels no need to facilitate immigration. For 
foreign workers, as for Dutch travelers, the place of their children's birth 
may be rather accidental. Many children born in the country leave again at 
a young age. Neither justice nor any pragmatic reason provides a strong 
basis for a general rule that everyone should be entitled to the nationality of 
his place of birth. Yet when birth in a given country has been followed by 
continuous residence there for the entire period of childhood, then, and 
only then, a strong reason exists for granting citizenship at the age of major-
ity, regardless of a possible criminal record: A country should take the re-
sponsibility for those whom it has brought up. 
15. See EEC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 48(3). 
